Replies

Eric,

You bring up some important points with your usual critical zeal. We touched on some of these points in class. Since you won’t be reading or responding to any responses (unfortunate, since criticisms merit responses and dialogue–that’s why you criticize), I welcome responses from others to Eric’s comments/criticisms.

A point worth reiterating with respect to one of Eric’s points: We’ve clearly seen statements by Whitehead as to our utter continuity with the world. We even saw his criticism of the misleading tendency to unidirectionally move from the wider world of nature (Eric’s niche in space-time) to human experience, but *not* from human experience to the wider world of nature.

Whitehead’s criticism is leveraged at Eric when he insists that:

“Aside from occupying a niche in space-time, humanity and its constituent individuals have no value (in the common-sense meaning of the term). You are not the world. If considered honestly, human experience offers no evidence suggesting otherwise.”

To the contrary, mutuality is the name of the game in Whitehead’s thought, as is value. Notice too, that Eric doesn’t define the “common-sense meaning of value.” Every event for Whitehead, whether those constituting space-time or those human experience is suffused with value. Value, Whitehead insists, is the “intrinsic reality of an event.” Parts don’t (only) have value by virtue of their contribution to the whole (a kind of utilitarian reading of the cosmos); rather, the whole would lack value without the individual value of the parts (mutuality again).

Contrary to Eric’s statements, there is nothing in human experience that actually divorces us from the world, or that reveals our lack of value. To stay that “individuals have no value,” whether a single event, or an individual human, or animal or what have you–is to misread Whitehead’s “pan-valuism” and its weddedness to his “pan-experientialism.” Experience and value go hand-in-hand, and they ultimately cannot be divorced from whatever perspective you analyze the world.

Other thoughts?

Dr. Davis

Rolla and Kent, Great post and conversation developing here.

A nice Eckhart quote too, Rolla, with an organic backdrop very consistent with that of Whitehead (and Watts). For Whitehead, we are exemplifications of the ultimate nature and character of things because everything is. We are not naively projecting *human* experience on nature; rather, “experience” is already a category of nature, of which human beings are a particularly acute expression. Experience thus applies all the way down (and up) and belongs to nature as an ontological primitive. You’re right to see the ethical implications involved in this conviction.

The discussion of tree is particularly fascinating and, as mentioned in class, it very well could be the case that a kind of uniform “tree experience” is a reality. I think we need to be open to this–especially in Whitehead’s universe. Here’s a great passage on trees/forests/interconnection by Whitehead (From Science and the Modern World):

“A single tree by itself is dependent upon all the adverse chances of shifting circumstances. The wind stunts it: variations in temperature check its foliage: the rains denude its soil: its leaves are blown away and are lost for the purpose of fertilization. You may obtain individual specimens of fine trees either in exceptional circumstances, or where human cultivation has intervened. But in nature the normal way in which trees flourish is by their association in a forest. Each tree may lose something of its individual perfection of growth, but they mutually assist each other in preserving the conditions for survival. The soil is preserved and shaded; and the microbes necessary for its fertility are neither scorched, nor frozen, nor washed away. A forest is the triumph of the organization of mutually dependent species” (SMW, 206).

Let us be like the forest, a triumph of “mutual assistance.”

Dr. Davis

Ben,

A great post raising some key points. We will being going into this question deeper next class, but for now, a few comments. Mesle wants to offer a reduced understanding of Whitehead’s “eternal objects” (pure possibilities). In fact, in my understanding he wants to rid Whitehead of pure possibilities completely and only insist upon “real possibilities” that are only inherent in the past alone. It also turns out that Mesle doesn’t like Whitehead’s God–and thus affirms “process naturalism.” He’s thus forced to problematize just those elements that Whitehead thought required God.

Possibilities for Whitehead are indeed metaphysically problematic. They are not actual, but the they are real; thus, they are not nothing, so something must be done about them. From the highest level, unactualized possibilities can’t float in a void for Whitehead (via his ontological principle), but must “subsist” in some actual entity. “God” is what Whitehead calls this actual entity, for what finite actual entity could possibly include the infinite and eternal possibly, or perform the functions on the possibly that allow for anything to emerge at all. The problems of possibly are not just their locus or status for Whitehead (although this is indeed a problem), but also their limitation, efficacy and relevance–and I would even add–their value. Again, we will come to this soon (and I like that you brought in Pannenberg’s and Moltmann’s futurity. See also Lewis Ford (as Charles rightly mentions below), Marjorie Suchocki, and also Roland Faber’s work too. All great resources.

As for aliens (!), you may know that I recently organized a Center for Process Studies conference precisely on this topic: “Astrobiology, Exo-Philosophy and Cosmic Religion.” The book is in the making. I also recently discussed this topic with Steve J. Dick, former NASA chief historian and expert in astrobiology, with the Cobb Institute. The recordings should be available in time.

In short, I think Whitehead’s metaphysics do connect us to billions of potential beings that exemplify the same metaphysical principles in ways appropriate to them (See ch. 11, “The Cosmological Order” in our readings for next class). In addition to the forthcoming book from the conference in which I take on Steven Dick’s “Cosmotheology” on Whiteheadian metaphysical grounds, I have also published a imaginative piece on the topic of extraterrestrial commonality via value. I’ve included this in the optional/deeper readings for next class if you have interest.

Cheers,

Dr. Davis

Charles,

A fantastic post confirming and clarifying the key dimensions of our second class, and also anticipating further sessions. I like your use of “omnisentience” for Whitehead’s “panexperientialism.” Other designations include “pansubjectivism” or “pancreativism” (Weber) and even pan-valuism (Lowe). Omnisentience may indeed avoid the misunderstandings associated with “panpsychism” and “panexperientialism” (as you suggest). But of course any term must be qualified.

I see you pointing to the inconsistency between essentially the claim that we are physically continuous (star dust), but metaphysically discontinuous with nature. Yet, as you say, if we are part and parcel of nature, these bifurcations must be overcome. In seeing that philosophy is the systematic endeavor to think through what reality must be like because we are part of it, our vision of things is truly transformed. We find that we belong here in the universe. And that’s no small matter, for belonging is the where our Being and our Longing connect (Be/Longing).

Great statements too regarding God. We will be heading there in time.

Best,

Dr. Davis

Thanks,Charles.

Cobb’s book is a certainly a classic. As for mine, it did recently come out in paperback–half the price!

Best,

Dr. Davis

Ben, a great post here!

I’m glad that the reading contextualized things a bit for you with respect to approaching Whitehead. That was my goal. No philosopher or philosophy is an island or wholly unique–and this is something Whitehead always appreciated. Your statements recall for me a quote by Whitehead about philosophy that we included in our first session. Note the last sentence about providing a “new,” but not “completely new platform.”

“[A]nybody who has any sense who writes on philosophy knows, or ought to know, that the world is unfathomable in its complexity and that anything you put together must be open to criticism—ought to be open to criticism if it is any good at all…to be a reasonably successful philosopher is to provide a new platform; perhaps not a completely new platform, but a slight alteration of some older platform from which it is worthwhile to make criticisms.”

Given this statement, Whitehead certainly was a “reasonably successful philosopher.” I think there are many points of uniqueness in Whitehead’s own contributions which inherent and transform ancient and modern intuitions and problems in order to offer a comprehensive vision of things that is consistent with human experience and the best of *current* science, philosophy and religion. We see here already that a philosophers “context” is always new–an important point to remember.

Whether his theory of “prehensions” (Which Hartshorne called “revolutionary”) or his particular take on the “dipolarity” (mental/physical) of each event (thus, neither idealism or materialism) or his distinction between modes of perception (casual efficacy, presentational immediacy, symbolic reference), or “Creativity” as “Ultimate of Ultimates,” and God as primordial and consequent—all of these are unique, and arguably “new” (or at least uniquely re-newed) with respect to the context at hand. I attach a brief introduction of mine to a recent edited collection which lays out Whitehead’s context and uniqueness a bit further (his various *mediations* between different ideas and thinkers).

We will be going deeper on some of these points as our course continues.

Great post,

Dr. Davis

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Jace,

Great comments and a deeply symphonic metaphysics:

“I have understood ‘moment’ to instead denote a quality of movement, as in a symphony whereby felt contrasts of cacophonous and euphonious rhythms harmonizing most readily, most synergistically during the process of concrescence determine duration.”

Beautiful. I’m glad you also brought out elements of permanence that are really there in Whitehead. Some have wanted to say that actual occasions have only split-second duration, but this could hardly be measured at any one “moment.” Nevertheless, measurable time manifests as the becoming of the durational flow of actual occasions. Whitehead appreciated the world of Bergson on this as you know (with his debate with Einstein).

You’re symphonic metaphor, inclusive of “nothing” and “everything” is captured in the following quote by Whitehead:

“Sometimes, during a good performance of the very greatest music, one has a sense that he is in the presence of infinitude, somewhat similar to what the composer must have felt when he was having to choose between one concept and another in the hope of expressing it. The definite concepts are there, but all around them hover the infinitudes of possibility—the other ways in which this vastness might have been expressed” (Dialogues of ANW)

We will be revisiting this musical metaphor in part 3 of my book.

Dr. Davis

Charles, I’m with you here!

Dr. Davis

Charles,

Thanks for your thoughts. Yes, my approach is quite similar. As I investigated the relational nature of ultimacy, I found I could not escape affirming the ultimacy of relationality. How I get there is deeply informed by Whitehead’s relationality, but also John Leslie’s Axiarchism (the reign of Value) and Keith Ward’s Idealism (the reign of Mind). The work of both men constituted the other prime sources of my dissertation. In the end, I argued for the mutual immanence and transcendence of the following abstract and concrete ultimates, each of which live through the other.

Mind
Value
Possibility
Actuality
Creativity
God
World

Eg. Mind lends to Value what Value cannot lends itself, just as Value lends to Mind what Mind cannot lend itself. In so doing, they live through each other in mutual immanence and transcendence. And so on with the others…

This list, of course, is not exhaustive–and Whitehead does admit an “unending” number of ultimate modes of existence.

Thanks too for your clarification with respect to Hegel. A “priority monism” and what some have called Whitehead’s “pluralistic monism” do seem like inversions of each other in a certain way. Perhaps we can say that Hegel emphasizes the monistic whole (One), and Whitehead the pluralistic parts (Many) of the Many, but even this would be inadequate for Whitehead, since his affirmation of the ultimate relationality of One and May allows him to move around them, e.g.: “It is as true to say…” that one is many and many is one from different perspectives. I intend to give more time to Hegel in time to get a better sense of these differences.

Best,

Dr. Davis

Charles,

Excellent, excellent commentary that nicely express the point I was trying to make about the mutuality of philosophy and theology (on a kind of vertical and horizontal axis [that is spinning] – limited as this image is). This is blatantly the case historically with respect to the endeavors of “philosophical theology”–As you mention–and as Whitehead himself saw, and also part and part and parcel of process philosophical theology. I questioned Eric as to why he thought it appropriate to offer a very broad definition of theology, only to then offer a very restricted edition of theology. You’ve offered a great response to his post.

Appreciate your thorough engagement thus far in the course material.

Dr. Davis

Friends,

A great discussion stimulated by Rolla’s initial (and valid) concern. As mentioned in class, I certainly could have included a variety of different “process thinkers”–and each of you do point out profound resonances by other voices that are worth including. I chose a rather select group because these figures are often included in common lists of process philosophers before, during and after Whitehead (see for example the optional Rescher reading). In short, I concede the point: many more could and should be included, but that was beyond the scope of the brief survey in the book.

As a resource, I’m looking forward to a forthcoming book by Keith Robinson: https://www.bookdepository.com/Process-Philosophy-Keith-Robinson/9781474244350

Dr. Davsi

Charles,

A wonderful post and dialogue emerging here. A quick comment from me for now:

Your bring up a very important distinction that you rightly see I’ve (quickly) passed over in my few quick about Hegel in the book. While I know Whitehead better than Hegel, I fully concede your point that “Absolute Spirit” is perhaps as improper to associate with “God” as “Creativity” is in Whitehead’s philosophy. It was very important for Whitehead to not ascribe God the foundation of the creative metaphysical drive in the universe (the problem of evil rises its head here–as Whitehead rightly), and the debate as to whether pantheism, panentheism or even “transpantheism” (Faber) continues to rage with respect to both Whitehead and Hegel in different ways. Whitehead in fact speaks of “air of pantheism” associated with his vision, but we will come back to this later in class.

A final comment about ultimacy in Whitehead: Creativity might be seen as “ultimate reality” while God can be seen as “ultimate actuality.” God requires creativity just as creativity requires God. The same can be said of “eternal objects”: God’s nature requires them just as they require God. While there are indeed multiple ultimates, they are all mutually reinforcing such that none can coherently be isolated and designated “The Ultimate.” As I’ve recently argued, true ultimacy in Whitehead is the “ultimacy of relationality” conceived in terms of “mutual immanence.” I’d be interested to hear whether you think something similar might be said of Hegel.

Again great post,

DR. Davis

Eric,

I welcome the skepticism of your comments! As mentioned, our first session starts more broadly. We will be narrowing our focus down to key elements of Whitehead’s philosophy starting next week.

It seems to me that you have a rather restrictive view of “theology.” Your statements offer an admittedly “broad” definition of philosophy, only to then offer a (very) restrictive and particular definition of theology. Why not extend the same broad courtesy to the theological endeavor?

Philosophers have defined “theology” in all variety of ways (e.g. Charles following Tillich in another post). You’ll remember that I did not offer a very particular definition of theology in my lecture. This was intentional. I instead offered a very broad definition that relates talk of “God” (variously defined) in relation to all that exists.

I also insisted that Whitehead was no theologian (and especially not in the sense that you have defined), but he absolutely *theologized* (and in fact read theology seriously as an extracurricular activity for nearly a decade) as a apart of his philosophical wonder. This background is implicit in the constructive “God talk” he includes in his metaphysics.

Like most people, Whitehead had a complicated relationship to Christianity and institutional theology. I trust you do as well. I certainly do. But to draw the strong wedge between Whitehead’s metaphysics and Christianity (or any other religious tradition for that matter) mistakes the distinct but entangled historical relationship between philosophy and theology. Whitehead engages, critiques and praises theological and religious traditions, and offers his own suggestions as to how the theological tradition should newly reform itself (We’ll see more of this later on in class).

Whitehead insists that metaphysics is necessary for theologians, just as it is for scientists and philosophers. This is an implicit welcome to theologians to utilize his metaphysics. What is more, he has insisted that “Christianity has always been a religion looking for a metaphysics.” The search continues. As I said in class: there is no “revealed” metaphysics.

You’re right to say that Whitehead must include the data religion offers, and that it must certainly “jive” with the best of our sciences. But your statements privileging “truth” to the domain of the empirical sciences is shortsighted. Whitehead is as critical of scientific dogmatism as he is of religious dogmatism. Both are guilty of abstractions and inadequate bifurcations–and both must ultimately “jive” with the presuppositions of life as lived and practiced. If they don’t they require revision.

Finally, your insistence that “Inherited notions of Christianity and the Christian theological tradition” cannot “jive” with current scientific understandings would come as news to a panoply of Christian philosophers and theologians–scientists among them. Do you know something they don’t? Religious traditions remain in process too, you know.

Cheers,
Dr. Davis