Replies

Yes. I believe that is correct. And for “life” the Category of Reversion comes into play to be able to make a change to those conceptual feelings to then project into the future in a different way, rather than just physical conformity. Not all occasions can do that in a way that we can discern.

For me, I think of Creativity as an overriding principle. Eternal objects participate in Creativity when they ingress and become actualized in an actual entity.

And then John Cobb Jr. says this on Page 30 of his Whitehead Word Book:

“Whitehead focuses attention also on the empty space in the cell, the space that lacks any social order, considering this important for the behavior of the cell as a whole. This lack of social order makes novelty possible. It is here that Whitehead locates the life of the cell. This empty space constitutes a “regnant nexus.” Presumably it is “regnant” in the sense that the cell as a whole responds to stimuli in novel ways that these nexūs make possible.
The sharp distinction between the societies and the nonsocial nexūs is based on the teaching that social relations are constituted by repetition of forms. On this understanding, any novel element that may enter into a member of a society does not affect the society as a whole, that is, it is not repeated by successors. Since life is distinguished by novelty, it cannot be the property of a society. Hence it belongs to a nonsocial nexus and that means to the occasions in empty space.”

Hmmm. Curiouser and Curiouser. Certainly not cut and dried. Is life in a living cell different than life in other societies, and therefore needs to be defined or thought of differently? Certainly life is distinguished by novelty but does it follow that anything exhibiting any level of novelty is alive? If life cannot be a property of a society per se as Cobb says, rather that the occasions that constitute it have that property, does that not restrict life to certain types of societies (like a cell) and not others (like human communities and musical pieces), as well as certain kinds of occasions (like those in a non-social nexus)?

Perplexity AI says this:
“Whitehead, in Process and Reality, uses the image of “a puff of existence in empty space” to describe life as a fleeting and localized burst of process amidst the general backdrop of the world. For Whitehead, life is not something wholly separate from the rest of the universe; rather, it is a special kind of “actual entity” or “actual occasion”—the fundamental unit of reality in his cosmology. He emphasizes that all things, including life, are events or processes rather than static material substances, and that even the simplest “puff” or occasion contributes to the creativity and interconnectedness that characterizes the cosmos.”

It is true that Whitehead does not sharply differentiate between life and non-life, but if, as the quote above implies, for him life is “a special kind of ‘actual entity'” does that not mean that there must be something in reality at some (perhaps extreme) point in that gradation, that is non-life? We just can’t really distinguish where exactly that point is?

I still don’t understand why he wouldn’t then just define all entities as alive at the onset and be done with it, thereby not having to talk about living occasions, or entirely living nexus, or living societies as if there were non-living ones. Why add that qualifier? What would be the point in adding that much confusion?

I still think we are missing something. Perhaps, hopefully, it will become clearer in class.

Interesting points! Thanks Dennis. I will have to think more on it. I am still not sure that when I define something I am not making a claim about reality. It seems to me I am. My definition may not be the final word, it may change or in another context be deemed insufficient when put to the test, but that would just be me making a new or different claim about reality at that point in time and space. That I think something is “this” rather than “that.” Hmmm. Still not sure how that differs from a theory but will think on it more.

However, my point in relation to the class has been that if Whitehead defines something a certain way we need to take that into account when discussing it. As I mentioned earlier, and as the Koutroufinis article summarizes, to Whitehead “life” is NOT a property of a society as such, it is the property of a non-social nexus that is entirely made up of “living occasions” (which are dominated by the intense novelty of the conceptual pole–not all occasions are) that he calls an “entirely living nexus.” Therefore, for a society to be “living” it requires at least one such to be included. We call it living BECAUSE it has at least one such nexus. That is the necessary and sufficient reason. In a living cell, such non-social nexūs are in the “empty space” or interstices between the physical parts (which are dominated by the physical pole).
Therefore I don’t think we can talk about ALL societies (like communities) being alive in a Whiteheadian context and be true to his definition. That would be defining it too wide by including too much. Living societies are a special case.
As we discuss I am even more interested in where things will lead, with new things to think about and take account of, in the upcoming class.
Thanks for the talk!

Dennis
I am learning so much from these discussions, as well as clarifying my own thoughts, I am not sure I would presume to correct you with some statement that has an equal chance of being incomplete, rather than just offer my own take on it. They are all works in progress for me.

I do look for definitions, even working ones, that are necessary and sufficient because otherwise I find it is too ambiguous and imprecise as to what is actually being talked about, and can result in major confusion if everyone is not on the same page.I think it can still reflect what you intend about a topic, but if it is not necessary and sufficient to what you intend, how can it actually do that in a way that everyone knows you are saying something is “this” rather than “that?” Unfortunately I don’t think all definitions are both necessary and sufficient, but I do think one should strive for it in philosophical discourse.

I would suggest that definitions do act similar to theories as far as being falsifiable. In fact, I might even suggest that unless a definition is objectively true such that everyone agrees on it (not sure there could ever be such a thing) it is very much a theory. And if the definition is overly broad, and then qualified and expanded until it includes everything, just like a theory would it eventually “dies a death of a thousand qualifications” and thus unfalsifiable and empty of meaning (Flew again). If all reality is composed of actual occasions, nexūs, and societies and ALL are living, then there is no non-living to contrast it to. There is no limitation. So then what do we mean by the term and why use it if we can’t say that it means “this” rather than “that?” So if Whitehead differentiates, describes, and defines what a living occasion, entirely living nexus, and a living society are, then there must be non-living ones.
That is how I see it at the moment.

One quick point: When I put on my philosopher hat I look for definitions that are both necessary AND sufficient. Just because they are necessary does not mean they are sufficient. Just food for thought.

George,
Hmmm. Sorry, but I am not sure I can agree with that characterization of life, and I am not sure what Whiteheadian definition of life you are referring to. I also can’t quite tell if you believe that is what Whitehead is saying or you are critiquing him because that is where you see his definition leads. Are you saying ALL societies, groups of societies, or even human generated social constructs like art, are alive to Whitehead? Where are the “living occasions” that are almost completely dominated by the mental pole so they barely have physical extension at all (or at all), or an “entirely living nexus” that he distinctly says is fundamental to his conception of a living society? Some of what you use as examples I would agree are societies (such as a human civilization in which the members inherit defining traits from each other), but a symphony as a society might be problematic (although the orchestra performing it is less so). But if all occasions, nexūs, societies (or groups of such), or collections of human generated sound frequencies (music – it is the humans that are being intensely creative not the notes themselves), were living why would he designate particular ones as living but not others? Why talk at all about “living” occasions, entirely living nexūs, or living societies as if they were a special form of such if they weren’t? Doesn’t seem like something Whitehead would do.

We would not, nor I think would Whitehead, talk about a herd of cows as being alive “as” a herd even though it inherits the past (it was brought together by a rancher at some point) and it introduces novelty by moving to a different part of the pasture every day in search of food. It even dynamically changes size as new cows are born and others die. I don’t think merely having those general traits is enough to be “living” in the Whiteheadian sense. Certainly it is a group of living societies, but is the herd itself alive? Seems like a stretch. At best it is an “aggregate” of living societies.

We have to be careful that defining “life” too broadly robs it of all meaning. It becomes no longer falsifiable so the definition is empty (as Antony Flew would say). I don’t think that is what Whitehead intends.

I am once again excited to see what clarification this week’s class will provide.

I am excited and interested in where this goes in this class on life and organism because it is one of the toughest things to wrap our heads around I think. Here is how I have thought of it (we’ll see if holds up after class):

Given that the an actual entity is the smallest indivisible unit, a nexus is a group of related actual entities, and a society is a socially structured group of related entities, here is what the article points out from Whitehead:

“Life is the coordination of mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society” (AI 207).

“[i]t is obvious that a structured society may have more or less ‘life,’ and that there is no absolute gap between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’ societies” (PR 102)

Whitehead designates living beings as living societies because some of their elementary processes (‘actual entities’) are characterized by (1) their mental pole, i.e., their activity of experience, being of special originality, thereby introducing novelty into the living society, and (2) their high relevance to the
development of the entire living society. These particularly creative elementary processes Whitehead calls ‘living occasions’ (PR 102, 104, 109, 184).

The totality of serially consecutive ‘living occasions’ constitutes a so-called ‘entirely living nexus’ (PR 104). A society is only a living being, and not just an organized microphysical society (atom, molecule), if it is governed by at least one entirely living nexus (PR 103). The truly living aspect of a living being consists of at least one entirely living nexus; even the simplest unicellular organism is governed by such a nexus (PR 103 f.)

So (this is me now), from this I have always understood that a living being is a society that has at least one “entirely living nexus” and as the article points out “not just an organized microphysical society.” An entirely living nexus is a group of related “living occasions.” The living occasions are highly creative actual entities that are characterized by predominantly prioritizing the mental pole, rather than the physical pole, and contribute to an entirely living nexus and subsequently a living society that we would call a living being.

Whitehead says that life in a living cell resides in the “interstices” or “space” between the physical forms within the cell itself. Those occasions are so characterized and dominated by spontaneous conceptual creativity they barely take form, if at all. But when the cell dies, those occasions are gone and the physical walls of the cell collapse in on itself.

I have always thought he called them “living occasions” because they are the occasions that contribute to the arising of an entirely living nexus and subsequently a living society. I did not think he meant that each individual occasion was “alive” in and of itself. A society can be called more-or-less alive depending on the extent such entirely living nexus dominate and enhance the intensity and complexity of the creative experience of that society.

The smallest actual living agent, then, would be a living society that had at least a spark of the intense creative experience that comes with including at least one entirely living nexus. And it goes from there…

Whew…

Thanks Bill! I am glad you are getting something out of it.

No,ha ha, Joshua and Matt didn’t ask me to join the class, I am here because although I find it fascinating I never specialized in Science and Whitehead so am eager to take a deeper dive than I have before. This class seemed like the perfect opportunity. I will be trying to participate as much as I can, however, to get different perspectives and refine my own. Mutual Transformation through dialogue as Cobb would say.

I have been trying to find and think of where Whitehead says that each “process of becoming” is a timeless duration and it is the serial sequence of such that is what we call time, but I haven’t found it yet. Doohh. I think you would just need to add “sequential” to the phase and make it “time is created (comes into being) through the sequential becoming of actual occasions.” I think that would work. Because each process of becoming starts with prehending the past actual world, and then projects into the future at concrescense, the actual process of becoming itself must be timeless. It is a singular event of experience, and it is the linear sequence of such events that we call time.

For Whitehead there are two types of eternal objects: “objective eternal objects” which are numbers/mathematical patterns, geometry, etc. that characterize the determinate physical form as we know it and perceive it; and “subjective eternal objects” that characterize emotions and other psychological states.
Both can be inherited (prehended) from the objective past actual world through hybrid prehensions, or conceptually prehended from the primordial nature.

Thanks Joshua. I will try to be available and present as much as I can. I will also try to contribute when I can to the forum but please feel free to let me know if I have gotten too technical or have missed the mark as you understand it. That in itself would be an interesting conversation…

This is a very technical conversation. I like it. Here is a quote from my Ph.D thesis that might be relevant, but will likely just raise more questions:

In the initial conformal stage, the event must conform, to some degree according to relevance, to the past actual occasions in its entire actual world. It must take account, in its entirety, of the fact that there is a series of past events that has led up to its own process of concrescence. For instance, an enduring object, mostly inherits, in this initial stage, that which contributes to its continuing existence as that entity. Whitehead says that each event predominantly inherits that which is most ‘intensely relevant’ to its own genetic continuance (PR 148). However, it must still take account of, ‘grasp,’ or ‘prehend,’ all other past actual occasions in its actual world. Whitehead calls this ‘perception in the mode of causal efficacy.’ It is the internal perception of all the past events that act as the efficient causation in the determination of each process of concrescence. In fact, the ‘actual world’ of an entity is precisely that which has causal efficacy for the determination of the event (PR 169). Each event feels, or ‘positively prehends,’ that which positively contributes to its own completion. Although it prehends all events in its actual world in varying degrees of relevancy and intensity, it negatively prehends that which does not contribute positively to its final determination, based on its own ‘subjective aim’ towards final satisfaction and in a manner consistent with its ‘subjective form’ that determines how the data is prehended.
“In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in which new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent phases. In these integrations ‘feelings’ contribute their ‘subjective forms’ and their ‘data’ to the formation of novel integral prehensions; but ‘negative prehensions’ contribute only their ‘subjective forms.’ The process continues till all prehensions are components in the one determinate integral satisfaction (PR 26).”
Past events that are negatively prehended still exist as part of the objective past; they just do not contribute in a positive way to the entity’s constitution. The ’principle of intensive relevance’ asserts:
“Any item of the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an abstract entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of any actual entity: it might have had more relevance; and it might have had less relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in the negative prehension; but in fact it has just that relevance whereby it finds its status in the constitution of that actual entity (PR 148).”

Wow. Complex questions. But important to understand as we move forward in the class I think. I will try to explain how I understand it and see how it fits.
Once again language becomes a problem because, as Whitehead has pointed out, we really do not have a language that is comfortable discussing processes.

Mechanistic and Organistic can both be considered organizing principles. When we same something is organized mechanically, like say a clock, we can call it a mechanism. The parts organize the whole in that the whole is merely a collection of such, although acting together. Each part can exist on its own as it is, whether it is in the clock or not. You take out a gear and it stays the same. A gear is a gear is a gear. It doesn’t change while outside the clock or as time goes on inside the clock. It does not require a relationship with the other parts of a clock to be a particular gear, it just does its part as it is designed. You can remove each part, study it and get to know how it acts, and you will know everything there is to know about the clock, including how it works. Standard reductionism.
When we say something is organized organically we mean something different. If something is organized organically, the whole organizes the parts in that the parts do not exist or act the same without the whole. You cannot study each part separately and see how they act without reference to how it acts within the whole, and in relation to ALL the parts. You also cannot come to know the whole without taking into account all the parts. Each defines the other. It is the relationship between the ALL the parts together and how they relate within the whole that determines how they act, and perhaps even how they are constituted. Our physicists have found this in Quantum Physics. You cannot study a quantum event without taking into account the measuring or observing apparatus, as well as the environment the test is being performed in, thus treating it as a whole system that includes all of it. Each part within something organized organically also acts differently, and perhaps is constituted differently, as the relationships change within the whole, making it a dynamic system. When that type of organization is present in a living system we call it an organism. Otherwise, we say it is “organized or constructed in an organic manner”. So no, there would be no immaterial , or purely conceptual, organisms. Although we might say a purely conceptual theory was developed organically if a bunch of ideas grew together dynamically in a relational way, only individually making sense when taken together with the other ideas that formed the theory. The theory itself would not be considered an organism though.
So typically when we say something is “an organism” not just organized in an organic manner, we mean a biologically living system. If you define the difference between living and non-living in a very definite black and white way, as we usually do, it is not really a problem to determine what we would call an organism or non-organism. However, that is not true for Whitehead. The dividing line between what he would consider living and non-living is a very grey ambiguous area. When you have reality fundamentally formed out of “events of experience” (the pan-experientialism the course will be looking at in a later class) and define the living and non-living in terms of intensity and complexity of experience as each event is “canalized” into the next in a serially ordered fashion, at what point would you consider the experience of the subject complex or intense enough to be called “living?” So Whitehead talks about societies as having “more life” or “less life” depending on how much creative ability leading to more intense complex experience is present or even possible.
Even this over-simplification is complex and difficult, so I hope I haven’t muddied the waters too much.

Just to give you some food for thought on your critique as the course moves forward as I am sure things will become clearer. Whitehead’s view of time is absolutely linear in that it is the linear succession of events of “becoming” (concresance). Because each event of experience inherits the past actual world in its initial phase of “becoming”, it is very cause and effect. The very notion of Creativity (Whiteheads Ultimate Category) is that each becoming entity inherits the past, introduces novelty, and projects into the next moment (the future).Thus contributing to the Creative Advance of the World. The succession of such events cannot NOT be linear. Whitehead definitely does NOT have a fully deterministic BLOCK TIME view of reality sometimes express in Physics.

However, each “becoming” itself is internally non-temporal. Although he speaks of the various “phases” of that becoming, that is merely for the sake of discussion, analysis, and understanding. It does not involve time. What we call Time comes into the picture as the linear succession of such events as they contribute to the “realization of the world”. So I think it could be thought of as the process of two realizations, the non-temporal process involved in each entity “realizing” itself (becoming real), and the linear succession (temporal) process of events genetically contributing to the realization of the world in a creative way.

I hope that helps and does not confuse things even more. I am sure as the course continues it will become clearer and make more sense. It is, after all, a process of realization.LOL.