Replies

Kaeti, Interesting post!
Among other things, you said, “Although my work is an imaginative and abstract representation, it is inspired by a materialist approach to consciousness that seeks to communicate the uniqueness of ‘the hard problem’.”
I’m also interested in the hard problem (what does it feel like to be a bat). As an IT scientist, I’ve always leaned toward the materialist explanation that we’ll eventually explain it as an emergence phenomenon of the complex brain. As we’re studying, Whitehead cuts the Gordian knot by assuming it’s always been there (in the world). I’m agnostic about where it came from because I don’t think we know what it is (first things first). -George

What makes an enduring object, a society, a structured society, and a nexus?

Seems to me these gatherings of entities apply whether they are actual entities or atoms

eg, Lower organisms
1. Societies: A society is a collection of actual entities that share a common defining characteristic or pattern of order. This shared characteristic allows them to function together in a unified way, providing stability over time. For example, atoms, cells, and organisms can all be considered societies of actual entities.

Eg, Human society
2. Nexus: A nexus is a general grouping of actual entities that are interconnected through their prehensions (relational interactions). Unlike societies, a nexus does not require a specific shared characteristic but reflects the relational web among entities.

eg, humans (or societies?)
3. Structured Society: A specialized type of society where the interactions among actual entities create a higher level of order and complexity. Examples include living organisms or human societies.

Eg, Rocks
4. Enduring Objects: These are societies with a particularly strong and stable pattern of organization, giving the appearance of persistence through time. For example, a physical object like a rock may be considered an enduring object.

Each grouping reflects different levels of complexity and stability within Whitehead’s metaphysical framework, emphasizing the interconnected and dynamic nature of reality.

Colleagues, As we’ve continued to discuss these interesting things, I’ve figured out that I may be a Whiteheadian in Kantian clothing. That is, I’m more comfortable with an epistemological approach than an ontological one. Here’s a couple of paragraphs explaining what I’m trying to say.

Immanuel Kant would likely have disagreed with Whitehead’s notion of actual entities being ontologically real in an objective sense. According to Kant’s critical philosophy, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason, human knowledge is limited to appearances (phenomena), which are shaped by the categories of the mind and our sensory experience. The ultimate reality, or noumenal realm (things-in-themselves), is fundamentally unknowable to us.

From Kant’s perspective, any claim about the fundamental building blocks of reality, such as Whitehead’s actual entities, would be speculative metaphysics beyond the limits of human cognition. Kant would argue that we can construct useful models based on experience and reason, but we cannot claim to know reality as it is in itself. In contrast, Whitehead’s metaphysics assumes that actual entities constitute reality in an ontologically objective way, which Kant would see as overstepping the boundaries of legitimate knowledge.

Thus, while Whitehead embraces a metaphysical realism about process and relationality, Kant would caution against asserting such ontological claims, arguing that they go beyond what reason can justifiably affirm.

Greg writes, “ What *is* this “organizing” is the question that’s central for me here.”

A new science has been developed since whitehead wrote called systems science (or systems theory), which adds a lot to our understanding of the (objective dimension of) organizing parts into wholes. Adding systems science to process philosophy has helped my understanding.

One last post on Kant versus Whitehead (complements of chatGPT)

Yes, Immanuel Kant would likely have disagreed with Whitehead’s notion of actual entities being ontologically real in an objective sense. According to Kant’s critical philosophy, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason, human knowledge is limited to appearances (phenomena), which are shaped by the categories of the mind and our sensory experience. The ultimate reality, or noumenal realm (things-in-themselves), is fundamentally unknowable to us.

From Kant’s perspective, any claim about the fundamental building blocks of reality, such as Whitehead’s actual entities, would be speculative metaphysics beyond the limits of human cognition. Kant would argue that we can construct useful models based on experience and reason, but we cannot claim to know reality as it is in itself. In contrast, Whitehead’s metaphysics assumes that actual entities constitute reality in an ontologically objective way, which Kant would see as overstepping the boundaries of legitimate knowledge.

Thus, while Whitehead embraces a metaphysical realism about process and relationality, Kant would caution against asserting such ontological claims, arguing that they go beyond what reason can justifiably affirm.

Classmates, Stella is a software product implementing some dimensions of *systems theory*, which was created after Whitehead wrote and adds a lot (imho) to our understanding of the societies, etc, of process philosophy. -George

Daryl, I strongly agree that (trying to) write stuff down is tge best way to clarify thought. So here goes again:

You said, “My contrary view is that process and experience are deeply-rooted in the explicitly ontological enterprise Whitehead is pursuing.”

I respond: I agree that process and experience are core parts of Whitehead’s ontology. But I guess that I am an “epistemological Kantian” and a doubter about ontology. Kant said there was a real world out there, but we couldn’t know about it (the neumenal world). All we can know is the phenomenal world (the world as interpreted by our brains). If whiteheadian’s agree that their ontology is only a map of the world and not the world itself then there’s no argument (but don’t mistake the map for the territory). That is, process and experience are examples of constructions we create in the phenomenal world.

One more post to indicate the variety of approaches taken within the process community. As we know, Whitehead posits discrete bits of experience occurring over time. Bergson, on the other hand, posits time and our experience of it to be continuous. The following *chatGPT article* also makes a point about the difference between ontological matters and epistemological ones.

Whitehead’s concept of the actual entity and Bergson’s notion of duration share some common ground but also present significant differences that could be seen as conflicting.

Common Ground:
1. Process and Becoming:
• Both philosophers emphasize a dynamic, process-oriented view of reality rather than a static one. Whitehead’s actual entities are constantly becoming through prehensions, while Bergson’s duration describes the continuous flow of experience and consciousness.
2. Experience as Fundamental:
• Whitehead and Bergson both argue that reality is better understood in terms of experience and process rather than fixed, discrete objects.

Key Differences:
1. Nature of Temporality:
• Bergson’s Duration: Time is seen as an indivisible, qualitative flow, irreducible to static moments or spatial representations. Duration is experienced subjectively and is fundamentally continuous.
• Whitehead’s Actual Entities: Each actual entity is discrete, with a beginning and end, and the passage of time is constructed through successive acts of concrescence (self-realization). Time is not an indivisible flow but consists of distinct phases of process.
2. Continuity vs. Discreteness:
• Bergson insists on the continuity of experience, resisting any notion of discrete units. Whitehead, in contrast, sees reality as composed of a multiplicity of actual entities, each achieving a kind of completeness before perishing and being succeeded by others.
3. Ontology vs. Epistemology:
• Whitehead’s actual entities are ontological building blocks of reality, foundational to existence itself. Bergson’s duration, however, is primarily epistemological and phenomenological—concerned with how time is experienced rather than how reality is fundamentally structured.

Potential Conflict:

The main tension arises from Bergson’s insistence on the indivisibility of duration and Whitehead’s use of discrete actual entities that, while interconnected, suggest a more atomistic understanding of process. Bergson might critique Whitehead’s system as still being too analytical and reliant on spatialized conceptions of time, whereas Whitehead might see Bergson’s approach as lacking the structural rigor needed to account for relational complexity.

In summary, while both philosophers emphasize process and dynamism, Bergson’s continuity-based view of time contrasts with Whitehead’s discrete, event-based metaphysics, potentially leading to a fundamental philosophical conflict.

Daryl, Thanks for the great poems and the question. My “both” referred to process and experience. (As I understand it, consciousness is an advanced form of experience.) Then I focus (this week) on experience. Here is a more extended definition of the words I’m trying to use:

Ontology and epistemology are two fundamental branches of philosophy, but they focus on different aspects of knowledge and reality.

1. Ontology (What is reality?)
• Concerned with the nature of being, existence, and reality.
• Asks questions like: What exists? What is the nature of objects, entities, and their relationships?
• Example: Debating whether abstract concepts like numbers or universals (e.g., beauty) have an existence independent of human thought.

2. Epistemology (How do we know?)
• Concerned with the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge.
• Asks questions like: How do we acquire knowledge? What justifies belief? What counts as true knowledge?
• Example: Investigating how scientific theories can be confirmed or what distinguishes justified belief from opinion.

In short, ontology deals with what exists, while epistemology deals with how we come to know what exists.

I may be misusing these terms. I accept (believe) that we (and at least some other things) have subjective experience and that there is an (ultimately unknowable) objective reality, of which we can make models. In science we can distinguish between “opinions” and “justified beliefs.” But these are weasel words where justification usually just means a lot of us agree. As you probably know, to be a scientific conjecture, a conjecture has to be falsifiable. I’m not sure subjective experience (as opposed to its objective correlates) will ever be scientific. And I accept that the world is bigger than science.

Bob, Thanks for responding to my post. I am a rank amateur in these matters and I value your leadership. And, as I said before, your book is the best. In my uninformed way, I think (so far) that I would like to support a process philosophy without pan-experientalism. In your informed way, you have said and written that you support process philosophy without Whitehead’s god construct. Btw, I’m with you on that, too. -George

Thanks all for your good comments. Greg said, “ If we don’t mistake our models for what is, then we must hold our models with a certain provisionalness, tentativeness.” Another way of saying this (and restating the fallacy of misplaced concreteness) is: “Maps are (very) useful. But don’t mistake the map for the territory.”

I think this is an important point. A literalist *does* mistake the map for the territory and may be outraged by any questioning of a part of the map/territory.

As I suggested last night, I think of his eight categories as axioms (or definitions) in his model of human (and beyond) experience. Models are maps of a territory but not the territory itself. Another model could very well have different categories. That is, all models are “wrong,” but some (like this one) are useful

I’m with you and Bob on the god question. The word has too much western baggage. Using it in some theology contexts may be required, but at the philosophy level no

Jay, I thought your 20 lessons were excellent. -George

Christie, Wonder, also called awe, may be the fundamental religious emotion as well as the fundamental education emotion. As Goethe said, education is lighting a fire, not filling a bucket.