JVangeest
It might be worth thinking the discussion of temporality in chapter two through readings of Henri Bergson and Simondon (this might also explain the distinction with the Cinema books, which I haven’t read but understand to be strongly Bergsonian).
The first two syntheses of time, which relate to the ‘living present’ and the ‘pure past’ are largely driven by Deleuze’s reading Bergson (though the use of ‘habit’ would seem grounded in Deleuze’s book on Hume). It is only the third synthesis, which relates to the future, that we get Deleuze’s original addition. For this, he leans on Nietzsche’s eternal return and Freud’s death instinct. My position would be that this designation of time also instigates a shift in temporality. [Perhaps this comes out of Heidegger’s critique of Bergson, given that in Being and Time, Heidegger argues that Bergson provides an ontic treatment of time and and ontological treatment of space]. In the introduction of Individuation in light of notions of form and information Simondon outlines his theory of ‘transduction’ in contradistinction to Hegelian ‘dialectics’ (which he generally praises), writing:
…just like dialectics, transduction conserves and integrates the opposed aspects; unlike dialectics, transduction does not suppose the existence of a preliminary time as the framework in which the genesis unfurls, since time itself is a solution, a dimension of the discovered systematic: time emerges from the pre-individual just like the other dimensions according to which individuation effectuates itself.(15-16)
If we translate this into Deleuze’s lexicon, it suggests that rather than thinking the operations of differenciation within time, the third synthesis of time is itself a consideration of the genesis of time through differenciation. Here, then, we’ll find the ‘actualisation’ of a ‘virtual time’ in the process of difference and repetition. This is not the repetition of difference in a ‘dialectical time’ but the construction or ‘actualisation’ of time through the repetition of difference. This process would, then, be constitutive of both time and space.